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550 Abstract
This paper models merit goods such as education and health, in a Lindahl-Foley 
environment in which public goods may be treated as private ones since merit 
goods are public goods that could have been provided privately.  It does so in terms 
of a Levitan-Shubik quasilinear quadratic utility from complementary commodities 
and uniform taxation of non-merit commodities to finance the provision of merit 
goods. This analytical framework serves best the purpose of characterizing the 
general equilibrium. Complementarity is found to serve as an engine for increased 
output after the introduction of taxation, with a higher volume of private goods, 
lower tax rate, and minimal price for the merit goods at the new equilibrium.
Keywords: merit goods, complementarity, quasilinear quadratic utility, excise 
taxation
1 INTRODUCTION
Although there is a debate concerning the content of the term “merit goods” (Des-
marais-Tremblay, 2017; 2019), the standard practice is to relate such goods to 
healthcare, education, and social protection spending, which are rival in private 
consumption and affect welfare through distribution policies; public goods like 
defense, are mostly non-rival in nature (Fiorito and Kollintzas, 2004). The first-
best strategy in providing merit goods is to those who need them after their iden-
tification, and this identification may be too costly to be administered. The sec-
ond-best strategy involves the taxation of non-merit goods that can substitute for 
the merit good, like TV vs. education, and subsidization of non-merit goods that 
can complement the merit good, like grocery and food for the poor (Schroyen, 
2005; Wenzel and Wiegard, 2006). In any case, merit goods are those goods and 
services that low-income households will under-consume if acquired on the basis 
of ability to pay, but which ought to be provided to these people by the public 
authorities. This “ought” is taken to be in violation of consumer sovereignty and 
hence, constitutes (soft) paternalism that does not fit the standard welfare econom-
ics framework (Cserne and Desmarais-Tremblay, 2018). However, there do exist 
attempts to model merit goods in the context of taxation (Schroyen, 2005; Lev-
aggi and Menoncin, 2008).
The empirical evidence is that merit goods are complements to private consump-
tion, which is not the case for public goods and hence the positive effects of merit 
goods on the economy exceed those of public goods (Fiorito and Kollintzas, 2004; 
Kotera and Sakai, 2017). This evidence confers real-world relevance on the theo-
retical argument that there is scope for complementarity between private and pub-
lic goods (Kaufman, 1998); it just sorts out which exactly are the public that are 
complementary to private goods. But, from this point of view, the provision of 
merit goods can be considered neither paternalistic nor incompatible with willing-
ness to pay, falling outside the realm of Pareto efficiency. People treat merit goods 
as complementary to their overall consumption when maximizing utility. Given in 
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551problem by financing the production of them from the proceeds of a tax on private 
consumption.
Assuming away considerations of saving, private consumption coincides with 
income before the introduction of merit goods. It could be represented by one 
consumer good in pre-tax utility, which utility nevertheless contains an argument 
applying to a would-be merit good too. Responsible for the satisfaction of the 
demand for the would-be commodity is government production, which is avail-
able to the consumer once demand for it is expressed. The production is made 
possible on the basis of taxation. The debate here is whether the tax should involve 
(i) a combination of income taxation and commodity taxation below the level of 
only a Pigovian tax or (ii) only “corrective” Pigovian taxation. It is a question 
motivated by environmental concerns but generalized to include any public good, 
posed because each choice results in the provision of different levels of public 
good (Chang, 2000).
Of course, the meaning of “corrective” under complementarity in a two-good 
framework, is tax income able to subsidize the production of the good with the 
positive externality. This is the only way to finance the production of a merit good 
but only if this good does not already exist in the economy; the income tax is also 
a tax on the consumption commodity. If merit goods already exist, the income tax 
is also a tax on these goods to subsidize their production (Schroyen, 2005). Con-
sequently, in this case, only commodity taxation on the private good may be used 
to finance merit-good provision. The general conclusion is that indirect taxation 
on non-merit goods is the means through which governments can in practice, 
regardless of the issue of pre-existence, supply merit goods. This is a conclusion 
applying to more than one private good, in which case only some substitutes for 
the merit good might be taxed, as the second-best strategy above prescribes. In 
any case, as soon as there is no dilemma about commodity tax alone or in combi-
nation with income tax, only one will be the level of merit-good provision.
Now, considering a merit good and a non-merit complementary consumption 
commodity, divided perhaps into a complementary and another complementary 
too, or substitute good, one in essence considers the whole economy. Comparative 
statics, then, such as those surrounding the “double dividend” controversy in envi-
ronmental economics, have in our case a flavor of macro-dynamics too. This is 
especially so when the origin of the discussion is the pre-merit goods pre-tax sta-
tus quo towards a new equilibrium that includes such goods, as follows: If the 
value of the volume of merit goods produced by the state is the one that consumers 
would prefer, the tax adjusts accordingly, and consumers absorb the value of the 
merit goods they wanted. Under conditions of private-public good complementar-
ity, they will also want to increase the consumption of private goods to at least its 
pre-tax level, which is not possible under the after-tax income. The associated 
excess demand will induce a price increase that will in turn encourage the supply 
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552 By Walras’s law, the value but not quantity of merit goods will decrease, which 
beyond ethics, is the economic reason why such goods should be offered at a 
minimal price: the private goods price increase will be smaller after the imposition 
of taxation, and their production larger. At the after-tax equilibrium, the volume of 
merit goods will be the one desired by the consumer, with increased volume of 
private-consumption goods and subsequently, a lower tax rate: Supply creates its 
own demand, after all. Much more so, under a sales or specific tax, which firms 
pass on to the consumer only partially. Such in a general viewpoint does not pre-
sume a framework of Lindahl-Pareto equilibrium workings, but does hypothesize 
a Lindahl-Foley environment in which public goods may be treated as private 
ones. The structure of public goods is the linear one presupposed by Lindahl so 
that preferences about such goods can be subject to the dictum that “more is pref-
erable to less”.
This is what is assumed by the next section too, but within the context of a quasi-
linear quadratic utility, implying that there does exist ultimately some point of 
satiation at which the utility from complementarity is exhausted. Three goods are 
assumed; one is the merit good, another one is a private good, which is strongly 
complementary to the merit good, and the third one represents other private con-
sumption, whose complementarity may be weaker. The intensity of complemen-
tarity is a way of motivating the distinction among the three goods, since one only 
complementarity index can be used by the utility function under consideration. 
The merit good may be public education, with school supplies being the strongly 
complementary one; this is a case relevant in terms of expenses to younger house-
holds. Or, the merit good may be public health promotion, with the strongly com-
plementary product being the unavoidable services from the private health sys-
tem, a case which is more relevant to older households1. Accordingly, the assump-
tion made about the presence of the bliss point in utility is reasonable. There is a 
point beyond which further education and purchase of school supplies or benefit 
from public and private health services, becomes meaningless; utility remains 
unchanged. In any case, judging from human development reports (Groot and van 
den Brink, 2006), the complementarity of the merit good with private consump-
tion may be strong, too.
The quantity supplied of this good is assumed to be the one coming out of the utility 
maximization problem à la Foley (1970; Florenzano and del Mercato, 2006) 
approach. It is produced by one public firm, financed either through an ad valorem 
tax or via a specific tax on the two private-sector commodities. The consumption of 
merit goods made possible by taxing complementary products will encourage the 
consumption of the taxed products as well. The tax rates are found to depend only 
on the supply of the merit good and the size of the public firm relative to the size of 
each of the two private firms. Calibrations suggest that ad valorem taxation is more 
1 There are many reasons why public education should be provided: the classical efficiency argument, but also 
from a distributive point of view this could be defended. Then the question is: how is the merit good argu-


































































44 (4) 551-566 (2020)
553flexible and less antagonizing of the private sector firms relative to revenue neutral 
specific taxation under consumer sovereignty, but the latter type of excise taxation 
is more precise in terms of optimality, fostering production efficiency as well. Given 
additionally the efficiency under which the public firm is supposed to operate, spe-
cific taxation is compatible with overall Pareto efficiency by comparison to ad 
valorem taxation. Section 3 concludes this paper by comparing the approach adopted 
here and its results with similar work. The main novelty in approach is, of course, 
the choice to analyze the subject in a Lindahl-Foley-type of framework under quasi-
linear quadratic utility. The main novelty in terms of results is that in so far as the 
financing of merit goods is concerned, only an institutional preference for private 
sector might justify the choice of a sales tax as a financing means.
2 FORMAL CONSIDERATIONS
Consider two complementary groups of products, qi, i = 1,2, being sold each at an 
average price of pi.There is also a non-profit public firm, providing at price ps 
another good, qs, which is complementary to qi and qj,  j = 1,2, j ≠ i. It does so by col-
lecting either an ad valorem tax or a specific tax imposed on the firms of the private 
goods at rates t and τ, respectively. That is, if πs denotes profit for the public firm,
 
                                           (1)
where cs is the average and marginal production cost of qs. Similarly,
  (2)
That is, indirect taxation is supposed to be revenue neutral, and the public-firm 
budget is balanced in line with Pareto efficiency requirements, given truthful rev-
elation if preferences; presumably, ps = cs.
The quantity of the public good produced is the one which is desired by the con-
sumer, who is assumed to behave in line with Levitan and Shubik’s (Shubik and 
Levitan, 1980; Choné and Linnemer, 2019) non-symmetric quasilinear quadratic 
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554 where σ(–∞,0) captures the extent of complementarity between qi and qj, and 
between qi and qs, on the average, because the complementarity between the two 
private goods may differ from that between these goods and the merit one. Param-
eter ω(0,1) is a weight reflecting the size of each firm, ω1+ ω2+ ωs=1. Consum-
ers take the ω‘s for granted. But, from the comparative statics viewpoint, the 
variations of ωs reflect variations of the size of this firm that do not necessarily 
reflect public-firm output variations in the same direction. A similar argument is 
applicable to private firms, with the observation that an increase, say, of ωs, 
implies a decrease of the sum (ω1+ ω2), but not necessarily of private firms’ output 
given that all products are complementary.
Coefficient a>0 measures quality; it is a (marginal) quality (or utility) index, one 
for each variety i, and s): Other things equal, an increase in  increases the marginal 
utility of consuming the good to which it refers. β > 0 shows how quickly the 
marginal utility of each good declines; it is a concavity parameter: Letting the left-
hand side of (3) be noted by Γ, . It is a very important 
parameter, because zeroing the total differential of this derivative for a given , 
one obtains: dω/dβ = –ω [1 – σ (1 – ω) ]/β (1 – σ) < 0, which indicates that an 
increase of the slope of the marginal utility curve decreases the size of the firm to 
which the differential refers. The steepness of the marginal utility presumably 
shapes the extent of complementarity as sellers provide the kinds of goods con-
sumers prefer: Zeroing again the total differential, and setting dω = 0, yields: 
; the higher the slope of the marginal utility 
curve, the weaker the complementarity is. These, of course, are trends expected to 
be qualified considerably by the introduction of taxation.
The indirect demand functions obtained from (3) are:
   (4)
and
  (5) 
If the public sector respects supposed consumer sovereignty regardless of the mar-
ket structure considerations surrounding the supply of private goods, the case with 
the specific tax will be in view of (5) and given (2):
  (6)
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555  (7)
from which, solving for τ, yields:
  (8)
Also, obtaining the sum (p1q1 + p2q2) from (4) by multiplication with the corre-
sponding qi, and solving for t, yields:
 
Although τ is independent of private sector circumstances, this does not appear to 
be true for t, because it depends on the production volume of the private goods. 
Nevertheless, there does exist a simple relationship between the two tax rates, 
which is obtained by noting that (7) becomes in view of (1):
 
   (9)
(9) is as independent of private sector considerations as (8) is. Moreover, it is 
susceptible to calibration under the same assumptions surrounding (8) for various 
τ‘s and values of the sum: (p1q1+p2q2), which is not the case with the more com-
plex expression regarding t above. The calibrations, of course, are a means of 
illustrating the overall picture resulting from the interaction of the partial deriva-
tives of comparative statics; an interaction whose outcome might be difficult to 
appreciate intuitively on the basis only of algebra.
The calibration assumptions about (8), derive from the complementarity between 
the public and private goods, rendering the numerator of (8) negative. Since the 
fraction has to be positive, the denominator has to be negative, or:
  
  (10)






































































This relationship between β and as is illustrated in Fig. 1, where, for example, β ≈ 5 
when as= 1:
Figure 1
f(x) ≡ β, x ≡ as, β ≡ 4/










f (x) = 4/(x^2)
.
The highest value as can take on is around 9 while it appears that it tends to zero 
as β tends to infinity; indeed, the marginal utility from the public good and the 
slope of the marginal utility curve are inversely related by definition. Calibrations 
should reflect this relationship, given that both solutions described by (10) are 
acceptable. The numerator of the solution with the negative square root, is posi-
tive because:



































































44 (4) 551-566 (2020)
557which is true, because ∆ > 0 if:  , which implies that 
 as well. In sum, both solutions in (10) are acceptable, 
given that their denominator is positive too.
Now, letting , and , we obtain the following 
simulations of (8) through wolframalpha.com:
Figure 2(a)
τ under: β = 15, a = 0.5, σ = –0.5
Figure 2(b)
τ under: β = 2, a = 2, σ = –0.5
Figure 3(a)
τ under: β = 15, a = 0.5, σ = –1
Figure 3(b)
τ under: β = 2, a = 2, σ = –1
Note at first that experimentations with the scale of  were found to change only the 
scale of axis. Note also that in all four diagrams there is a ridge running from the 
origin of the three axes to some maximum value of the specific-tax rate, which is 
the highest the calibrations can give. The points along the ridge reflect the optimal 
combinations among tax rate, public firm size, and public sector output. They com-
prise a stable locus. Contrasting the figures based on a steep marginal utility curve 
on the left, with those on the right where this slope is much smaller, one concludes 
that the optimal size of the state firm and of its output increase as the slope becomes 
larger. The tax rate becomes smaller, because the output of the private complemen-
tary goods increases, too. The intuition here is that the faster the rate at which one 
unit of the merit good provides its utility, the more units of this good have to be 
provided in order to satisfy demand once there is no option of subsidized non-merit 
goods. Also, comparing the diagrams on the top with those at the bottom, one infers 
that these increases in public sector magnitudes become greater as complementarity 
becomes stronger, with the difference becoming smaller as the slope of marginal 
utility curve becomes smaller, too. The stronger the complementarities in the eyes of 
the consumer, the more the public firm and by complementarity, the private firms 
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558 away from the locus, will increase size (output) unless τ is reduced, limiting the 
expansion of both, with the reduction of  τ being larger when complementarity is 
stronger. That is, any movement away from the locus will destroy the market of non-
merit goods. These conclusions are crosschecked mathematically in the Appendix.
Next, t ≡ z is simulated based on (10) and under: x  (0,1), y  (0,10) again, and 
β = 2, a = 2, σ = –1:
Figure 4(a)
t under: (p1q1+ p2q2) = 40,τ = 0.1
Figure 4(b)
t under: (p1q1+ p2 q2) =80,τ = 0.1
Figure 5(a)
t under: (p1q1+ p2q2) = 40, τ = 0.2
Figure 5(b)
t under: (p1q1+ p2q2) = 80, τ = 0.2
Figure 6(a)
t under: (p1q1+ p2q2) =40, τ = 0.3
Figure 6(b)
t under: (p1q1+ p2q2) = 80, τ = 0.3
If the figures on the left are compared with those on the right, t decreases consider-
ably as the value of the private sector goods increases, because presumably the tax 
base increases. Also, comparing the diagrams by rows and columns, we can see 
that t increases faster in response to increases in τ as the value of the private goods 
becomes smaller, because, apparently, of the difference in tax base. Moreover, 
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559once they become parallel to each other, a certain public firm size can accommo-
date the provision of very large quantities of the merit good under a modestly 
increasing t. They also suggest that the same quantities might be provided under a 
smaller size but at higher t ‘s. These conclusions are based on the tendency of the 
parallel contours to be slightly upward sloping starting from some minimum con-
figuration of t, ωs and qs. In sum, ad valorem taxation is more flexible and less 
antagonizing of the private sector firms relative to revenue neutral specific taxa-
tion under consumer sovereignty, but the latter type of excise taxation is more 
precise in terms of optimality. The difference in optimal private sector size implies 
that specific taxation induces a private-firm structure prone to realizing economies 
of scale that are high relative to the case of ad valorem taxation. That is, specific 
taxation fosters not only consumer sovereignty, but also production efficiency. 
Given additionally the efficiency under which the public firm is supposed to oper-
ate, specific taxation is more compatible with overall Pareto efficiency than ad 
valorem taxation.
3 CONCLUDING REMARKS
There is the possibility that both taxes are associated with the same increase of 
private goods’ output; the specific one, as the result of the tax rate decrease 
prompted by the increased efficiency of smaller firms after the tax, and the sales 
tax, because of the tax rate decline induced by higher production capability on the 
basis of larger post-tax private-firm size vis à vis producer size under the sales tax. 
There is no way to check this out in the framework of this paper. But if it is true, 
and both taxes are consistent with overall Pareto efficiency, then, insofar as the 
financing of merit goods is concerned, the ultimate choice between the two taxes 
is the institutional attitude towards the size of the private sector. Commodity, in 
general, taxation has been found here to be welfare enhancing not only because of 
the macroeconomics of “supply creates its own demand”, mentioned in the intro-
ductory section and verified more or less by the calibrations, but because also of 
the analytical context of differentiated oligopoly (Cremer and Thisse, 1994) sub-
sumed by the use of quasi quadratic utility (Choné and Linnemer, 2019). It is also 
a Lindahl-Foley context, but with respect to complementary goods, verifying the 
conclusion that a Walrasian equilibrium does exist in quasilinear markets for such 
goods, too (Azevedo, Weyl and White, 2013). It would still exist under weak 
Pareto optimality if the preferences for merit goods were assumed to be patho-
logical (as del Mar Racionero (2001) assumes), but coming out of intergenera-
tional altruism (Raut, 2016), given that health and education do hinge upon inter-
generational concerns.
Of course, there is a number of critical assumptions behind our results, which 
need to be rechecked by a broader analytical framework, especially with respect 
to the choice of utility function, the hypothesis of general complementarity, and 
the Lindhal-Foley apparatus. For example, all prices here have been conjectural, 
but the optimum can still be decentralized, and complementarity between merit 
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560 according to Diamantaras, Gilles and Scotchmer (1996), may not hold under dif-
ferent assumptions, unless at least the postulate about general complementarity is 
relaxed. Moreover, although our Walrasian equilibrium under general comple-
mentarity presupposes a largescale economy, having subsequently countrywide 
relevance, the optimal scale justified by a model setting differing from ours may 
be the local jurisdiction. Furthermore, although one might contend in view of 
Levaggi and Menoncin’s (2008) findings that our results are robust to the qualifi-
cation of tax evasion because simply they refer to merit goods provision − quali-
fication making sense if these goods exist already in the economy and consumers 
choose on the basis of after-tax income − this viewpoint needs to be reassessed. In 
any case, the comparative statics should have the macro-dynamic character origi-
nating in the transition from a pre-merit good status quo to the new equilibrium 
following the introduction of such a good in the economy.
The bottom line is that the provision of merit goods can serve as an engine of 
economic growth and development in a free market economy. The paper was not 
written to support this claim; this thesis merely stemmed from a theoretical argu-
ment illustrated through calibrations and motivated by the empirical evidence that 
these goods and complement private consumption. It is a position stripped of any 
ethical directives, and is irrelevant conceptually to concerns about the efficiency 
of public education and/or health provision. After all, health and education are 
social capital, boosting productivity and growth (Brooks and Nafukho, 2006), 
conferring at least short- and long-term well-being as well, even if the Easterlin 
paradox is correct (Bartolini and Sarracino, 2014). Nevertheless, it is a proposi-
tion that might complement the quests for merit goods as means of alleviating the 
income inequality that undermines the system of free enterprise, and of internal-
izing by the state such psychological externalities as multiple preference order-
ings and the failure of agents to choose in their own best interests (Mann, 2006).
Disclosure statement


































































44 (4) 551-566 (2020)
561REFERENCES
1. Azevedo, E. M., Weyl, E. G. and White, A., 2013. Walrasian equilibrium in 
large, quasilinear markets. Theoretical Economics, 8(2), pp. 281-290. https://
doi.org/10.3982/te1060
2. Bartolini, S. and Sarracino, F., 2014. Happy for how long? How social capital 
and economic growth relate to happiness over time. Ecological Economics, 
108, pp. 242-256. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2014.10.004
3. Brooks, K. and Nafukho, F. M., 2006. Human resource development, social capi-
tal, emotional intelligence: Any link to productivity? Journal of European Indus-
trial Training, 30(2), pp. 117-128. https://doi.org/10.1108/03090590610651258
4. Chang, M. C., 2000. Rules and levels in the provision of public goods: The 
role of complementarities between the public good and taxed commodities. 
International Tax and Public Finance, 7, pp. 83-91.
5. Choné, P. and Linnemer, L., 2019. The quasilinear quadratic utility model: An 
overview. HAL Id: hal-02318633.
6. Cremer, H. and Thisse, J.-F., 1994. Commodity taxation in differentiated oli-
gopoly. International Economic Review, 35(3), pp. 613-633. https://doi.
org/10.2307/2527077
7. Cserne, P. and Desmarais-Tremblay, M., 2018. Merit goods. Forthcoming. In: 
M. Sellers and S. Kirste, eds. Encyclopedia of the philosophy of law and social 
philosophy (Springer, 2021). TILEC Discussion Paper, No. DP 2018-008. 
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3119566
8. Del Mar Racionero, M., 2001. Optimal tax mix with merit goods. Oxford Eco-
nomic Papers, 53(4), pp. 628-641. https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/53.4.628
9. Desmarais-Tremblay, M., 2017. Musgrave, Samuelson, and the crystallization 
of the standard rationale for public goods. History of Political Economy, 
49(1), pp. 59-92. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-3777158
10. Desmarais-Tremblay, M., 2019. The normative problem of merit goods in per-
spective. Forum for Social Economics, 48(3), pp. 219-247.  https://doi.org/1
0.1080/07360932.2016.1196593
11. Diamantaras, D., Gilles, R. P. and Scotchmer, S., 1996. Decentralization of 
Pareto optima in economies with public projects, nonessential private goods and 
convex costs. Economic Theory, 8(3), pp. 555-564. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s001990050105
12. Fiorito, R. and Kollintzas, T., 2004. Public goods, merit goods, and the relation 
between private and government consumption. European Economic Review, 
48(6), pp. 1367-1398. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.01.004
13. Florenzano, M. and del Mercato, E. L., 2006. Edgeworth and Lindahl-Foley 
equilibria of a general equilibrium model with private provision of pure public 
goods. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 8(5), pp. 713-740. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00285.x
14. Foley, D., 1970. Lindahl’s solution and the core of an economy with public 


































































44 (4) 551-566 (2020)
562 15. Groot, W. and van den Brink, H. M., 2006. What does education do to our 
health? In: Measuring the effects of education on health and civic engage-
ment: Proceedings of the Copenhagen Symposium, ch. 4, pp. 355-363.
16. Kaufman, H., 1998. Topics in Public Economics: Theoretical and Applied 
Analysis. Cambridge, AK: Cambridge University Press.
17. Kotera, G. and Sakai, S., 2017. Complementarity between merit goods and 
private consumption: Evidence from estimated DSGE model for Japan. KIER 
Discussion Paper, No. 978.
18. Levaggi, R. and Menoncin, F., 2008. A note on optimal tax evasion in the pres-
ence of merit goods. Economics Bulletin, 8(7), pp. 1-13. https://doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.979687
19. Mann, S., 2006. Merit goods in a utilitarian framework. Review of Political 
Economy, 18(4), pp. 509-520. https://doi.org/10.1080/09538250600915691
20. Raut, L. K., 2016. Two-sided altruism, Lindahl equilibrium, and Pareto opti-
mality in overlapping generations models. Economic Theory, 27, pp. 729-
736. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0562-9
21. Schroyen, F., 2005. An alternative way to model merit good arguments. Jour-
nal of Public Economics, 89(5-6), pp. 957-966. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpu-
beco.2004.05.006
22. Shubik, M. and Levitan, R. E., 1980. Market Structure and Behavior. Cam-
bridge MA: Harvard University Press.
23. Wenzel, H. and Wiegard, W., 2006. Merit goods and second-best taxation. 


































































44 (4) 551-566 (2020)
563APPENDIX
The results from Figs. 2 and 3, appear to be at variance with the intuition that dω/
dβ < 0, coming out of the total differential: d(2Γ/q2). The reason is, certainly, the 
presence now of τ. Solving (8) for ωs, and differentiating with respect to β, yields 
that:
 
The calibrations assume that (asqs – 1) > 0, and the sign of the derivative: dω/dβ 
appears that it should “continue” being negative. But, note that:
 
which in our calibrations holds with the positive sign, because (asqs – 2) > 0 has 
been postulated, too. Now, letting all expressions below incorporate the assump-
tion that σ < 0: ωs/qs > |ωs/β| iff:
which is true, because if the result: dσ/dβ < 0, which obtains in connection with: 
d(2Γ/q2), is to continue holding in the presence of taxation, the denominator of:
has to be positive, given a positive numerator, implying, in turn, that:
and hence:
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564 Moreover, continuing to incorporate in the expressions that σ < 0:
and, we have the total differential:
The results from the calibration reflect this algebra. They are plausible because 
according to Fig. 1, there cannot be that: (asqs – 1) < 0, and because they are not 
influenced by the scale of qs ≡  y.
